University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

2011

Uncomfortable Embrace: Federal Corporate
Ownership in the Midst of the Financial Crisis
Steven M. Davidoff

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Davidoff, Steven M., "Uncomfortable Embrace: Federal Corporate Ownership in the Midst of the Financial Crisis" (2011). Minnesota
Law Review. 463.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/463

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Article

Uncomfortable Embrace: Federal
Corporate Ownership in the Midst of the
Financial Crisis
Steven M. Davidoff †
The federal government struggled mightily to rescue the
financial system during the panic of fall 2008. The government’s hurried, frenetic response can be described as “regulation by deal,” a term David Zaring and I coined to explain the
ad hoc process by which the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the U.S. Department
of the Treasury (Treasury Department) attempted to rescue
failing financial firms and resolve the market crisis within the
limits of their legal power.1 When the government concluded its
dealmaking, it was left an unwilling holder of debt and equity
interests throughout the financial sector. For good measure, it
also owned sizable equity stakes in two of the country’s three
largest automotive manufacturers.
The structure of this ownership was a product of the Treasury Department’s “regulation by deal” approach. The Treasury
Department did not use any single template. Instead, each new
rescue and deal brought different ownership terms and models.
The government effectively nationalized Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; took controlling equity interests in General Motors
(GM), GMAC, and American International Group, Inc. (AIG);
acquired noncontrolling equity and debt interests in Citigroup
and Chrysler; and purchased nonvoting preferred securities in
† Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. This Article was prepared for, and presented at, the University of Minnesota Law Review Symposium, “Government Ethics and Bailouts: The Past, Present, and
Future.” Copyright © 2011 by Steven M. Davidoff.
1. See Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 463 (2009);
see also STEVEN M. DAVIDOFF, GODS AT WAR: SHOTGUN TAKEOVERS,
GOVERNMENT BY DEAL, AND THE PRIVATE EQUITY IMPLOSION (2009).

1733

1734

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[95:1733

the 707 banks that received Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP) funds. In each case, the acting government agency utilized different mixtures of common, preferred, and debt securities, and negotiated divergent corporate governance terms. The
agencies arranging this assistance also failed to maximize the
economic and legal terms of each investment in its origination
when measured against what a private sector participant
would likely have negotiated.
Both the Bush and Obama Administrations repeatedly professed unease with this ownership. The Obama Administration
was the more vocal of the two. In a series of memos and pronouncements, the Obama Administration disavowed any socialist or corporatist intent. The Administration publicly set forth
the following principles: (1) the federal government acquired
these ownership stakes solely due to the exigent circumstances,
(2) would adopt a hands-off approach in monitoring its investments, and (3) would seek to dispose of these investments as
soon as practicable.2 These principles were sometimes formalized in agreements with invested companies.3 Yet again, both
the Bush and Obama Administrations took different approaches to implement these principles depending upon the investment.
The Bush and Obama Administrations’ frenetic responses
raise the more fundamental issue of how the government
should actually structure its investments. Must the government structure its investments as a commercial shareholder—
on arms-length, commercial terms? Alternatively, should it recognize the inherently political nature of such ownership and attempt to limit undue political influence through a voluntary
cession of control? If so, what is the appropriate measure of
control the government should retain? Regardless of its investment model, to what extent should market terms dictate
the government’s investment?

2. See Press Release, The White House, Obama Administration Auto Restructuring Initiative, General Motors Restructuring (Mar. 30, 2009) [hereinafter Press Release, General Motors Restructuring], available at http://www
.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Fact-Sheet-on-Obama-Administration-Auto
-Restructuring-Initiative-for-General-Motors; Press Release, Written Testimony of Herbert M. Allison, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Financial Stability, Domestic Policy Subcommittee of the Oversight and Government Reform Committee (Dec. 17, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press
-releases/Pages/tg453.aspx.
3. See infra Part II.A.
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This Article tackles these questions.4 It draws early lessons
from the government’s corporate ownership during the financial crisis and develops principles to guide the structure, monitoring, and retention of future investments. Part I sets forth
the different models of government ownership during the financial crisis, highlighting the Treasury Department’s regulation-by-deal approach to ownership.5
Part II assesses the government’s ownership experience
and provides a near-term critique of the corporate governance
structures the government utilized. These programs lost relatively small sums compared to the economic harm averted. This
success was in part due to the Bush and Obama Administrations’ preinvestment structuring principles that relied on commercial norms to set the terms of these investments. Still, the
Treasury Department—the government agency primarily responsible for these investments—left money on the table by
failing to negotiate full commercial terms and by repeatedly
spurning opportunities to acquire substantial equity stakes in
its investments. The Treasury Department also unduly forfeited significant post-investment control over these investments in order to limit future political influence. It instead relied on soft-control mechanisms such as independent directors
and their willingness to heed the government’s wishes due to
corporate social norms. These mechanisms had value, but we
do not and may not ever definitively know their true worth;
their impact is difficult to calculate and the facts of the inner
workings of the structures have yet to be disclosed.
The limits of soft control were never fully tested due to the
timely market upturn that salvaged the government’s investments. In this light, the Bush and Obama Administrations’
failure to negotiate a level of ultimate control in many cases
appears to have been an error, though one for which the government did not have to pay the consequences. My criticism is
quite directed. Control comes in all shapes and sizes, and in
this context, when I refer to ultimate control, I mean the ability
to remove and replace a majority of directors at some time in4. For articles looking at the issue of government ownership from the
shareholder perspective, see Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder: Implications for Delaware, 35 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 409 (2010), and J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes
Corporate Theory and Practice, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 287 (2010).
5. For another cogent analysis of government ownership, see Barbara
Black, The U.S. as “Reluctant Shareholder”: Government, Business and the
Law, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 561 (2010).
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terval. This fallback level of control together with softer governance forces would have provided the government all the control
it likely needed, while actually giving it a control mechanism in
case soft and other governance forces did not succeed. But the
government was so skittish about any level of control that it
forfeited even this fundamental investor right.
The final part of this Article draws on the analysis in Part
II to offer some lessons for future government corporate ownership. The ultimate lesson of government ownership during the
financial crisis is that such constructs are inherently unstable
given U.S. citizens’ current political attitudes toward public
ownership of private enterprise. Understanding beforehand
what the goals of such ownership are and having a holistic view
of societal wealth maximization can lead to the creation of better corporate structures to govern such ownership and more effectively maximize these investments. United States government corporate ownership will remain quite rare. When it does
occur, however, the government should adhere to these general
goals while adopting the mantra of a commercial investor as
the starting point for its investments. No other model is likely
to have as much legitimacy.
The lessons of the financial crisis also point to flexibility in
such ownership structures. Simply advocating the private equity model may not be sufficient when a back-door influence
model can work in a similar manner with greater overall political effectiveness. This jibes with the practical reality that future government ownership is likely to adopt similarly heterogeneous patterns as each crisis is its own unique entity shaped
by political, market, and legal realities. In other words, each
crisis brings its own form of “regulation by deal” that drives the
ownership structures the government devises. Because each
crisis will be different, any set ownership rules are likely futile,
leaving us with basic principles to rely upon—principles which
assume future flexible implementation. This insight ultimately
informs academic theory on firm governance, illustrating that
no single model alone can explain or is appropriate for all corporate governance arrangements.
I. THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP
This Part outlines the structure of government ownership
in its various forms through the financial crisis. The government’s investments were not only numerous, but heterogeneous
in form and structure. This Part sets forth the terms of each
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significant investment and also outlines the corporate governance terms the government negotiated in each case.
A. AIG
The government began its ownership experience with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (together, the government-sponsored
enterprises or GSEs). However, these were quasi-public entities, which were effectively nationalized. The federal government only truly embraced private ownership when it acquired a
controlling interest in AIG amidst the financial panic of 2008.
Financial assistance to AIG was patterned on a failed, private
rescue effort for the company as well as the government’s prior
investment in the GSEs.6 But this time the government was
much more circumspect about acquiring full control or eliminating the private nature of a corporate enterprise.
The keystone of the federal government’s initial assistance
was an $85 billion loan extended by the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York.7 The interest rate was 8.5 percent over the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) plus 8.5 percent on undrawn funds and a commitment fee of $1.7 billion.8 These loan
terms were initially based on private sector terms, but the Federal Reserve later eased them as AIG continued to decline financially. The Treasury Department would subsequently authorize additional assistance up to $69.8 billion under the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA).9 Ulti6. See generally ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL (2009).
7. AIG, Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 22, 2008) [hereinafter AIG
2008 September Form 8-K], available at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
5272/000095012308011496/y71452e8vk.htm. This loan was subsequently reduced to a maximum amount of $60 billion. See AIG, Current Report (Form 8K) (Oct. 27, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/
000095012308013926/y72249e8vk.htm; Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys. (Nov. 10, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/other/20081110a.htm. For a more in-depth analysis of the
AIG bailouts, see William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 943 (2009).
8. See Credit Agreement exhibit 99.1, Sept. 22, 2008, between American
International Group, Inc. and Federal Reserve Bank of New York [hereinafter
AIG 2008, exhibit 99.1], available at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/
000095012308011496/y71452exv99w1.htm; see also Matthew Karnitschnig et
al., U.S. to Take over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject Cash as
Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at A1, available at http://online
.wsj.com/article/SB122156561931242905.html.
9. Hugh Son, AIG Rescue Cost Narrows by $2.9 Billion, U.S. Says, BUS.
WK., May 21, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-05-21/aig-rescue
-cost-narrows-by-2-9-billion-u-s-says-update2-.html.
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mately, the government would authorize up to $182.3 billion in
direct assistance through these and other programs.10
In connection with the origination of the initial $85 billion
loan, AIG also issued to the Federal Reserve preferred securities equivalent to a 79.9 percent voting and dividend interest in
AIG.11 These shares were convertible into AIG common stock
upon the amendment of AIG’s certificate of incorporation to
permit this conversion.12 The ownership interest would later be
reduced to a 77.9 percent interest (with a 79.77 percent voting
interest) when, in connection with a TARP investment, the
Treasury Department was issued a warrant equivalent to two
percent of AIG’s common stock.13
Like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, AIG also left outstanding in public hands a 20.1 percent effective interest in its equity.14 The reason for this outstanding interest was not announced, but it was likely attributable to perceived and actual
budgetary and legal limitations.15 The AIG common stock remained in public hands and traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). AIG even performed a reverse stock split to ensure that its stock continued to qualify for listing on the NYSE
under its listing standards.16 The trading in AIG stock rose to
such volumes that the Wall Street Journal subsequently characterized it as a “casino,” with people placing uninformed bets
on whether AIG’s equity was worthless or not.17
10. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-475, REPORT TO
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: UPDATE
OF GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO AIG 13 (2010), available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d10475.pdf.
11. AIG 2008, exhibit 99.1, supra note 8.
12. Id.
13. AIG, Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 25, 2008) [hereinafter AIG
2008 November Form 8-K], available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/5272/000095012308016447/y72888e8vk.htm. The government’s use of
preferred stock in this and other circumstances is reviewed in Joan MacLeod
Heminway, Federal Interventions in Private Enterprise in the United States:
Their Genesis in and Effects on Corporate Finance Instruments and Transactions, 40 SETON HALL. L. REV. 1489–505 (2010).
14. See AIG 2008, exhibit 99.1, supra note 8.
15. The ownership level was kept below eighty percent in order to prevent
AIG’s liabilities from being consolidated onto the federal government’s balance
sheet.
16. Frequently Asked Questions, AIG, http://www.aigcorporate.com/
investors/rev_split_faqs.html (last modified Feb. 9, 2011).
17. See Susan Pulliam & Tom Lauricella, Traders Seek Fortune in AIG,
Stock Once Left for Dead, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2009, at A1, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125366502247832417.html (“AIG, arguably, has
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The AIG preferred securities issued to the Federal Reserve
were subsequently placed into an irrevocable trust for the benefit of the Treasury Department.18 The Federal Reserve appointed three trustees to administer the trust.19 The trust instrument provided the trustees with complete power to vote
and dispose of the government’s shares.
The government effectively ceded control over both its
ownership interest and AIG by placing its shares into this
trust. The government also narrowly directed the trustees to
operate the company with a view toward repaying amounts
owed to the government.20 The only other management direction was to not disrupt the financial markets.21 These were
light touches and an almost complete cessation of control. The
Federal Reserve maintained a measure of control through its
loan agreements, although the covenants here were similar to
those applicable to a credit-worthy borrower rather than the
more lengthy covenants contained in the high-yield debt that
AIG would now be required to provide in the private market—if
it could even raise debt.22 The Treasury Department also retained the right under the terms of its preferred shares to appoint two directors to the board if AIG missed dividend payments on the preferred shares for four consecutive quarters.23
AIG did indeed miss these payments, and on April 1, 2010, the
Treasury Department appointed independent, retired corporate
executives.24 Meanwhile, at AIG’s 2010 shareholder meeting,
the trustees directly recommended five directors to AIG’s elev-

been the biggest casino of all. In the past seven weeks, its common shares
have careened between $13 and $55, surging past $54 on Tuesday before closing at $45.80.”).
18. See AIG, Current Report (Form 8-K), exhibit 10.1 (Jan. 16, 2009) [hereinafter AIG Trust Agreement], available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/5272/000095012309001128/y74153exv10w1.htm.
19. Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Statement Regarding Establishment of the AIG Credit Facility Trust (Jan. 16, 2009), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2009/an090116.html.
20. AIG Trust Agreement, supra note 18.
21. Id.
22. Government Investment, Role of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, the U.S. Department of Treasury, and the Trustees, AIG, http://www
.aigcorporate.com/GIinAIG/role_trustees.html (last modified Feb. 9, 2011).
23. AIG 2008 November Form 8-K, supra note 13.
24. See James Sterngold & Rebecca Christie, AIG Board Grows with Two
New Directors Named by U.S., BUS. WK., Apr. 1, 2010, http://www
.businessweek.com/news/2010-04 -01/treasury-to-name-layton-rittenmeyer-to-aig
-board-update1-.html.
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en-member board with the remainder being recommended by
the AIG board itself.25
After the deposit of the preferred shares with the trust, the
only remaining direct control the government exerted over AIG
was through the executive compensation requirements administered by special master Kenneth Feinberg.26 Behind the
scenes, though, the government still exerted real control. It is
still unknown whether AIG’s board or executives directly
spurned any government request. But both the board and top
executives were repeatedly replaced at the behest of either the
Federal Reserve or the Treasury Department.27 News reports
gave the impression that the Treasury Department still
wielded great day-to-day authority, and the Assistant Treasury
Secretary for Financial Stability regularly met with AIG executives, including AIG’s chief executive officer.28
The government thus operated AIG in a queasy vacuum.
AIG was to be a private company but the government’s ownership brought political considerations into its operating decisions. Its quasi-public nature often left the public wondering
about the measure of control the government asserted. At times
it also affected employee morale.29 Meanwhile, it was an open
question about how this ambiguity affected the day-to-day performance of the company and its ability to create value for its
largest stakeholder, the federal government.
On September 30, 2010, AIG announced an agreement
with the Treasury Department to restructure these invest-

25. AIG: Where Is the Taxpayers’ Money Going? Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Oversight and Governmental Reform, 111th Cong. 122–23 (2009)
(statement of Douglas L. Foshee) [hereinafter AIG: Where Is the Taxpayers’
Money Going], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg53019/
pdf/CHRG-111hhrg53019.pdf.
26. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, The Special Master
for TARP Executive Compensation Issues First Rulings (Oct. 22, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg329.aspx.
27. See, e.g., Andrew Clark, Outgoing AIG Chief Gives Up $22m Payoff,
GUARDIAN, (Sept. 22, 2008), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/sep/22/
insurance.marketturmoil (“Willumstad was told to step aside in a phone call
made personally by the treasury secretary, Henry Paulson.”).
28. See, e.g., AIG: Where is the Taxpayer’s Money Going, supra note 25, at
13 (statement of Edward M. Liddy, Chairman and CEO, AIG) (noting that officials of the Treasury Department regularly met with AIG executives to discuss
the company’s business).
29. Richard Beales et al., A.I.G. Needs A.I.A. Deal Soon, N.Y. TIMES, June
11, 2010, at B2, available at 2010 WLNR 11918633.
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ments to facilitate a disposition of the government’s positions.30
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York would be repaid the
approximately $46 billion it was owed. While $20 billion would
come from asset sales, approximately $22 billion would come
from newly borrowed TARP funds.31 The remainder of the
proceeds used to repay the government would come from asset
sales by AIG.32 If the restructuring is completed on these
terms, only the Treasury Department would maintain an interest in AIG in the form of a number of series of preferred stock.33
The parties have also agreed that this preferred stock would
subsequently be repaid by asset sales, including the sale of
AIG’s interest in Asian insurer AIA.34 In connection with this
restructuring, the other outstanding preferred shares in the
amount of $49.1 billion would be converted into common shares
of AIG, comprising 92.1 percent of the company.35
AIG also announced that the AIG Trust would be liquidated upon completion of this restructuring and that the Treasury Department would directly hold this 92.1 percent interest.36 The Treasury Department did not agree to any
restrictions on its ability to appoint directors—such as a requirement that they be independent. This was a remarkable
turn. Not only had the Treasury Department surpassed the
eighty percent threshold in terms of ownership, it no longer actively sought to restrict its control rights.
B. CITIGROUP
The government’s investment in Citigroup also evolved as
the financial crisis continued and the bank’s financial state deteriorated. On October 14, 2008, the Treasury Department announced that it would purchase $25 billion worth of preferred
securities in Citigroup under the TARP Capital Purchase Program (CPP).37 This investment was part of the government’s
$125 billion initial TARP investment in the country’s nine larg30. Press Release, AIG, AIG Announces Plan to Repay U.S. Government
(Sept. 30, 2010), available at http://www.aigcorporate.com/newsroom/2010_
September/AIGAnnouncesPlantoRepay30Sept2010.pdf.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. AIG 2008 exhibit 99.1, supra note 8.
34. Press Release, supra note 30.
35. AIG 2008 September Form 8-K, supra note 7.
36. Id.
37. Floyd Norris, Another Crisis, Another Guarantee, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25,
2008, at B1, available at 2008 WLNR 22496172.
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est financial institutions.38 Subsequently, and in order to recapitalize Citigroup, the Treasury Department was forced to twice
rework its investment and provide further assistance under the
TARP Targeted Assistance Program.39 The Treasury Department eventually exchanged $12.5 billion worth of TARP preferred securities for Citigroup common stock.40 The exchange
was first announced on February 27, 2009 during the final days
of the Bush Administration.41 After this exchange concluded on
September 10, 2009, the Treasury Department owned approximately 7.7 billion shares of Citigroup common stock, $27.059
billion in preferred securities, and warrants to purchase 465.1
million shares of Citigroup common stock.42
The Treasury Department also became the largest shareholder of Citigroup with a 33.6 percent ownership interest upon
the completion of this exchange.43 Unlike its stake in AIG, the
government did not place this ownership position into an irrevocable trust. An official at the Treasury Department would
later assert that the reason for the difference was that the
EESA prohibited such a trust arrangement.44 This interpretation was a stretch, however, as the law did not directly address
38. Id.
39. See Citigroup, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Feb. 27, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831001/000095010309000421/
dp12698_8k.htm.
40. See Citigroup, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), exhibit 99.9 (July
23, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831001/0000
95012309024819/y78424exv99w1.htm (“Citi Completes Exchange Transaction
with Private Holders and U.S. Government Matching Exchange”).
41. Press Release, Citigroup, Inc., Citi to Exchange Preferred Securities for
Common, Increasing Tangible Common Equity to as Much as $81 Billion (Feb.
27, 2009), available at http://www.citigroup.com/citi/press/2009/090227a.htm.
42. Citigroup, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 26, 2009) [hereinafter Citigroup 2009 February Form 10-K], available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/831001/000120677410000406/citi_10k.htm.
43. See Press Release, Citigroup, Inc., Citi Announces Shareholder Approval of Increase in Authorized Common Shares, Paving Way to Complete
Share Exchange (Sept. 3, 2009), available at http://www.citigroup.com/citi/
press/2009/090903a.htm (“Upon completion, the U.S. government will own
7,692,307,692 shares, or 33.6 percent of outstanding shares.”).
44. See Troubled Asset Relief Program, The U.S. Government Role as
Shareholder in AIG, Citigroup, Chrysler, and General Motors and Preliminary
Views on Its Investment Management Activities, Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform,
111th Cong. 18 (2009) (statements of Orice Williams Brown, Director of Financial Markets and Community Investment, and A. Nicole Clowers, Acting
Director of Physical Infrastructure) [hereinafter GAO Testimony], available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10325t.pdf.
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the issue. More likely, criticism of the government’s actions
with respect to AIG had made the Treasury Department more
wary of forfeiting its ownership interest.
Despite the Treasury Department’s retention of ownership,
the government still contractually limited its control rights.
The Treasury Department agreed with Citigroup that it would
vote its shares in proportion to all other shares cast except for
certain designated matters, which included “the election and
removal of directors.”45 Even then the Treasury Department
never publicly nominated or removed any directors to the Citigroup board or otherwise acted in a forthright manner to exercise these reserved rights. After the conclusion of the exchange
offer, the only crisis-originated power the government asserted
upon Citigroup was with respect to the executive compensation
requirements under the TARP.46 This authority was removed
on December 23, 2009, when Citigroup redeemed $20 billion in
outstanding preferred securities held by the Treasury Department.47
The government again wielded significant soft and indirect
power outside of its formal arrangements—primarily exercised
through its ability to oversee the company under its bank supervisory powers.48 In addition, members of the Treasury Department were briefed on Citigroup’s major decisions and
helped to select new board members.49 Here, as with AIG, politicians also repeatedly acted to assert the government’s ownership position by way of financing to pursue their own political
endeavors.50 For example, one widely quoted article in the New
45. Exchange Agreement exhibit 10.3, June 9, 2009, between Citigroup,
Inc. and United States Department of the Treasury [hereinafter Citibank 2009
Exchange Agreement], available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
831001/000119312509128765/dex103.htm.
46. See GAO Testimony, supra note 44, at 3.
47. Citigroup 2009 February Form 10-K, supra note 42.
48. See Eric Dash, Citi Is Urged to Replace Its Chairman, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 12, 2009, at B1, available at 2009 WLNR 581479.
49. Deborah Solomon & David Enrich, U.S. to Take Big Citi Stake and
Overhaul the Board, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2009, at C1, available at http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB123570659457790823.html?KEYWORDS=take+big+
Citi+stake+and+overhaul+the+board (“[T]he government is demanding that the
New York company overhaul its board of directors, the people said. Treasury
will call for Citigroup’s board to be comprised of a majority of independent
directors.”).
50. See Steven Brill, What’s a Bailed-Out Banker Worth?, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 3, 2010 (Magazine), at 32, available at 2010 WLNR 84978 (discussing
specific examples related to Senator Barney Frank and others).
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York Times Magazine detailed how individual Congress members exercised significant authority over the company.51
The Treasury Department contractually committed to dispose of Citigroup’s common stock by the ten-year anniversary
of the exchange offer’s completion.52 It would not take that
long.53 On December 14, 2009, Citigroup announced that the
government intended to sell its stake over the following six to
twelve months.54 The first sale took place on April 26, 2010,55
and by December 2010 the Treasury Department had disposed
of its entire interest—an investment that ultimately realized a
$12 billion gain.56
C. GM AND CHRYSLER
The government provided financial assistance to GM and
Chrysler in two stages.57 In the first stage, it provided sufficient financing for the companies to operate through the transition from the Bush to the Obama Administration.58 Under the
TARP Automotive Industry Financing Program, GM and
Chrysler received loans from the Treasury Department of $13.4
billion and $4 billion, respectively.59 In both instances the Bush
Administration extended the loans under the assumption that
they would not be sufficient for the continued operation of the
company.60 Under the terms of each loan, each company was
51. Id. (highlighting Senator Barney Frank’s and other members of Congress’s attempts to influence Citigroup’s compensation plans for their
executives).
52. Citibank 2009 Exchange Agreement, supra note 45, exhibit 10.3.
53. See Citigroup, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), exhibit 99.1 (Dec. 14,
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831001/0000950123
09070361/y80976exv99w1.htm.
54. See id.
55. See David Lawder & Maria Aspan, Treasury Begins Sale of Citigroup
Stake, REUTERS, Apr. 26, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
2010/04/26/us-citigroup-treasury-idUSTRE63P4KD20100426.
56. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Pricing of Citigroup Common Stock Offer (Dec. 6, 2010), available at http://www
.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/TG995.aspx.
57. See OFFICE OF FIN. STABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, AGENCY
FINANCIAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 35 [hereinafter OFS FINANCIAL
REPORT 2009], available at http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational
-structure/offices/Mgt/Documents/OFS%20AFR%2009_24.pdf.
58. See David Cho & Lori Montgomery, Bush Prepares Request for Rest of
Bailout Funds, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp
-dyn/content/article/2009/01/09/AR2009010902846.html.
59. OFS FINANCIAL REPORT 2009, supra note 57, at 102–03.
60. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-553, AUTO INDUSTRY:
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required to develop a plan for “financial viability” for the Obama administration to consider by February 17, 2009.61
In the second stage, after the presidential transition, the
Obama Administration decided to provide significant additional
financial assistance to both companies.62 The full background
behind the decision to provide additional assistance to the two
automakers has yet to be publicly disclosed, but it appears to
have been based on two fundamental assumptions. First, the
Automotive Task Force headed by Steven Rattner and headquartered in the Treasury Department concluded that the
overall costs of liquidating the automakers would be greater
than providing assistance.63 Second, the Treasury Department’s investment was based on the assumption that each of
the automakers would be able to function independently after
their restructuring.64 With respect to the latter decision, some

SUMMARY OF GOVERNMENT EFFORTS AND AUTOMAKERS’ RESTRUCTURING TO
DATE 2 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09553.pdf.
61. See id. at 2 (discussing the GM and Chrysler loan programs); General
Motors Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 31, 2008) [hereinafter GM
2008 December Form 8-K], available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/40730/000095015209000103/k47265e8vk.htm (detailing GM’s loan agreement); Loan and Security Agreement, Dec. 31, 2008, between General Motors
Corporation and U.S. Department of the Treasury [hereinafter GM 2008 Loan
Agreement], available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/
investment-programs/aifp/Documents_Contracts_Agreements/Posted%20%20
Contract%20-%20GM%20Original%20Loan%20and%20Security%20Agreement%
20with%20amendments%2009-09-09.pdf; Loan and Security Agreement, Dec.
31, 2008, between Chrysler Corporation and U.S. Department of the Treasury
[hereinafter Chrysler 2009 Loan Agreement], available at http://www
.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/investment-programs/aifp/Documents_
Contracts_Agreements/Chrysler%20LSA%20as%20of %2005-26-10.pdf.
62. Between these two stages, another $6.36 billion in loans would be extended to GM, including $361 million for a warranty program and $280 million in loans to Chrysler for a similar warranty program. CONG. OVERSIGHT
PANEL, SEPTEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE USE OF TARP FUNDS IN THE
SUPPORT AND REORGANIZATION OF THE DOMESTIC AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 9–
10 (2009) [hereinafter COP REPORT].
63. See JONATHAN ALTER, THE PROMISE: PRESIDENT OBAMA, YEAR ONE
183 (2010) (“With 225,000 employees, 500,000 retirees, 11,500 suppliers and
6,000 dealers, liquidation was never an option.”); STEVEN RATTNER,
OVERHAUL: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S
EMERGENCY RESCUE OF THE AUTO INDUSTRY 52–53 (2010).
64. See RATTNER, supra note 63, at 53; Obama Administration New Path to
Viability for GM & Chrysler, U.S. DEPARTMENT TREASURY, http://www
.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/investment-programs/aifp/Documents_
Contracts_Agreements/autoFactSheet.pdf (last visited March 23, 2010) (“While
GM’s current plan is not viable, the Administration is confident that with a
more fundamental restructuring, GM will emerge from this process as a
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in the Administration doubted the Automotive Task Force’s
conclusion as to the viability of Chrysler.65 The viability conclusion for Chrysler thus appears to have been driven by political
and macroeconomic considerations regarding the effects of its
collapse on state economies.66
To achieve these goals, the Automotive Task Force ultimately decided to restructure each of these entities through use
of the § 363 sale provisions in the Bankruptcy Code.67 Its use of
this procedure was quite novel and controversial.68 To ensure
that there were minimal legal challenges to this device, the Automotive Task Force brokered significant compromises with
unsecured and secured lenders as well as other stakeholders,
including employees.69 This approach affected the terms of the
actual ownership position the government took in each entity.70
In order to ensure a quick bankruptcy process and viable postbankruptcy companies, the Treasury Department converted a
large portion of its initial investments from debt to equity.71
The post-bankruptcy ownership of GM is set forth in the
following diagram:
stronger more competitive business . . . . Chrysler has reached an understanding with Fiat that could be the basis of a path to viability.”).
65. Steven Rattner, The Auto Bailout: How We Did It, FORTUNE, Nov. 9,
2009, at 55 (describing the characterization of government intervention as
“creeping socialism” in the eyes of some observers).
66. See RATTNER, supra note 63, at 120–23; Rattner, supra note 65, at 55,
61 (elaborating on some of the “hard hit” communities that could potentially
shoulder most of the burden associated with a collapse of the automotive
industry).
67. See Mark J. Roe & David A. Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy,
108 MICH. L. REV. 727, 731–32 (2010) (elaborating on the government’s decision to use § 363 as a tool in the restructuring of Chrysler).
68. See id. at 729 (“The Chrysler bankruptcy process used undesirable
mechanisms that federal courts and Congress struggled for decades to suppress at the end of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries
. . . .”); Todd J. Zywicki, Chrysler and the Rule of Law, WALL ST. J., May 13,
2009, at A19, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124217356836613091
.html. But see Stephen J. Lubben, No Big Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in
Context, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 531, 532 (2009) (suggesting that this use of a
§ 363 sale is “entirely within the mainstream of chapter 11 practice for the last
decade”).
69. Roe & Skeel, supra note 67, at 733–34.
70. See COP REPORT, supra note 62, at 19–20.
71. See id. For details on the terms set forth, see generally Master Transaction Agreement, Apr. 30, 2009, between Fiat S.p.A., New CarCo. Acquisition
LLC, Chrysler LLC, and the Other Sellers Identified Herein, available at http://
www.ohiopracticalbusinesslaw.com/uploads/file/Chrysler%20Purch%20Agmt%
281%29.pdf.
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GM Shareholders (Pre‐IPO)
12%

10%

17%

Unsecured Creditors
UAW Retiree Medical
Benefit Trust
Treasury Department

61%
Canadian and Ontario
Government
72

Unsecured creditors received a ten percent stake in GM
plus warrants to purchase an additional fifteen percent ownership interest; the UAW Retiree Medical Benefit Trust (UAW
Trust) received a seventeen percent stake plus a warrant to
purchase 2.5 percent of the new company; the Treasury Department received a sixty-one percent stake; and the governments of Canada and Ontario received a twelve percent ownership interest.73 The Treasury Department also received debt
and preferred securities worth $9.2 billion and extended a loan
of up to $30.1 billion.74
The post-bankruptcy ownership of Chrysler is set forth in
this diagram:

Chrysler Post‐Bankruptcy
Ownership
2%
10%

Fiat

20%

68%

UAW Retiree Medical
Benefit Trust
Treasury Department
Canadian and Ontario
Government

72. These figures assume that the warrants issued by GM are not exercised.
See Gen. Motors Co., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Aug. 18, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/archives/edgar/data/1467858/000119312510192195/
ds1.htm.
73. COP REPORT, supra note 62, at 20–21.
74. Id.
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The Treasury Department received a ten percent ownership stake in Chrysler; the governments of Canada and Ontario
received a two percent ownership stake; Fiat received a twenty
percent ownership interests with a right to raise its stake up to
thirty-five percent of the company upon its achievement of certain milestone events; and the Chrysler Voluntary Benefit Employment Association received a sixty-eight percent stake. The
Treasury Department also extended a new loan in the amount
of $8.5 billion to the post-bankruptcy Chrysler.75
In both cases the Treasury Department maintained direct
ownership of these interests and did not deposit them into a
trust.76 The Treasury Department also contractually agreed to
forego direct control over each company.77 The Treasury Department limited its right to appoint directors in a stockholder
agreement to ten of the twelve directors in the case of GM.78
However, the agreement required that two-thirds of the board
be comprised of independent directors. After July 10, 2009, any
new members appointed by the government were required to be
independent.79 Any subsequent directors would be appointed by
these independent directors and not the government, though
the government retained the right to vote against their election
or remove them.80 If the government removed a director, it
could act to replace him or her with another independent director.81
In the case of Chrysler, the Treasury Department also negotiated a stockholders agreement providing it the right to ap-

75. OFS FINANCIAL REPORT 2009, supra note 57, at 35.
76. See COP REPORT, supra note 62, at 3 (suggesting that at least some
consideration was given to placing these equity interests into an independent
trust where they would be “insulated from political pressure and government
interference”).
77. Id. at 29 (describing the relatively passive control the government
maintained over the day-to-day decisions of the companies).
78. Id. at 15.
79. Stockholders Agreement § 2.2, Oct. 15, 2009, between General Motors
Holding Company (to be renamed General Motors Company), United States
Department of the Treasury, 7176384 Canada Inc., UAW Retiree Medical
Benefits Trust & solely for purposes of Section 6.20, General Motors Company
(to be converted to General Motors LLC) [hereinafter GM Stockholders
Agreement], available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/
investment-programs/aifp/Documents_Contracts_Agreements/GM%20Corporate%
20Docs.pdf.
80. For GM, the UAW Trust received one board seat, the Canadian government received one seat, and the U.S. government received ten seats. Id.
81. See id.
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point three of the nine initial directors.82 Two of these directors
were required to be independent and would pick a third independent director.83 In Chrysler’s case, the Treasury Department gave up its rights to remove or replace any of these directors. The independent directors on the board would replace
them.84 The board was also required to be independent until
Fiat obtained majority control of the company.85
In GM’s case, the above arrangements were specifically set
up to coincide with an initial public offering (IPO) of the company’s stock.86 The Automotive Task Force negotiated intricate
governance mechanisms for post-IPO GM, but not Chrysler,
which further restricted the government’s ability to exercise
control.87 In the case of GM, the Treasury Department agreed
to give up the vote on its shares except for key governance matters after an IPO, election and removal of directors, a sale or
change of control of the company and any amendment to GM’s
certificate of incorporation or bylaws affecting such rights.88
The Voluntary Employee Benefits Association divested itself of
all voting rights agreeing to vote its shares proportionately
both before and after an IPO.89 In addition, the agreement provided for a joint slate nomination process after the IPO with
the Canadian government in which both the Treasury Department and Canadian governments would attempt to jointly nominate directors after the IPO was consummated in proportion to
their shares owned.90 The Treasury Department also commit-

82. The other directors were appointed as follows: the UAW Trust received one board seat, the Canadian government entities one seat, and Fiat
three seats rising to four seats (and replacing one government entity) when its
ownership rose to thirty-five percent or above. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
the Treasury, Obama Administration Auto Restructuring Initiative, ChryslerFiat Alliance (Apr. 30, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/
press-releases/pages/tg115.aspx.
83. Draft Form of Amended and Restated Limited Liability Company Operating Agreement § 5.3(d), May 12, 2009, New CarCo Acquisition LLC (on file
with author).
84. Id. § 5.3.
85. Id. § 5.3(e).
86. See GM Stockholders Agreement, supra note 79, § 3.1 (establishing an
IPO time frame consistent with the requirements mentioned earlier regarding
board composition).
87. See id. (discussing voter agreement requirements).
88. Id.
89. Id. § 4.2(b).
90. Id.
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ted to force GM toward an IPO by July 10, 2010, unless GM
was already taking reasonable steps to effect one.91
The government again wielded great political influence
over GM and Chrysler, both behind the scenes and overtly
through other means.92 Even before this transaction, the Automotive Task Force had arranged the resignation of the GM
and Chrysler CEOs.93 The Treasury Department also put provisions in the automakers’ financing documents to ensure that
jobs stayed in the United States.94 Similar to what occurred in
the case of Citigroup, Congress acted overtly to influence the
automakers and even legislatively reversed the automakers’ attempts to shut down a number of automotive dealerships.95
Post-investment, both automakers disclosed that they regularly
consulted with the government on significant decisions.96 Indeed, the Treasury Department acted under its registration
rights agreement to cut back the number of shares sold in the
GM IPO in order to attempt to secure a greater return.97 Moreover, the Treasury Department’s loan agreements contained
rights to periodic financial information.98 Much of this authori91. Id. § 3.1.
92. See Micheline Maynard, The Steadfast Optimist Who Oversaw G.M.’s
Long Decline, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2009, at B1, available at 2009 WLNR
5935410 (detailing a specific instance of influence over the automakers).
93. See id. (attributing Rick Wagoner’s resignation to heavy pressure from
the Obama Administration).
94. See GM 2008 Loan Agreement, supra note 61 (requiring that the
agreement be construed in a way that “preserves and promotes the jobs of
American workers employed directly by [GM] and in related industries”); see
also RATTNER, supra note 63, at 240–41.
95. See William Ehart, Spending Bill Lets Dealers Fight to Regain Chrysler Franchises, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2009, at A1, available at 2009 WLNR
25326064.
96. See David Shepardson, GM’s Latest Plan Would Cede Control to U.S.,
DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 28, 2009, http://detnews.com/article/20090428/AUTO01/
904280361/GM-s-latest-plan-would-cede-control-to-U.S; see also Bill Vlasic, In
G.M.’s Comeback Story, a Pivotal Role Played by Washington, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 3, 2010, at B1, available at 2010 WLNR 21952943.
97. Nick Bunkley & Michael J. de la Merced, U.S. Is Said to Rein in G.M.
Stock Offering, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010, at B1, available at 2010 WLNR
18994162.
98. For the details of these reporting requirements, see generally GM
2008 Loan Agreement, supra note 61 and GM 2008 December Form 8-K, supra
note 61. See generally Loan and Security Agreement, Jan. 16, 2009, General
Motors Corporation and U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury [hereinafter GM 2009 Loan
Agreement], available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/
investment-programs/aifp/Documents_Contracts_Agreements/Redacted%20LSA%
20and%20Amendment%20and%20Termination%2001-16-09.pdf; Chrysler 2008
Loan Agreement, supra note 61.
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ty, however, apparently originated from the Treasury Department rather than other government actors.99
D. GMAC
On December 24, 2008, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors approved GMAC’s application to become a bank holding
company.100 In connection with this approval, GMAC received a
TARP investment under the Automotive Industry Financing
Program.101 The Treasury Department purchased $5 billion in
preferred securities with an eight percent dividend and received a warrant to purchase preferred equity valued at $250
million and with a nine percent dividend.102 The Treasury Department also extended GM a loan under the TARP program to
fund GM’s purchase of up to $1 billion in additional equity in
GMAC.103 The GMAC investment was a purchase of nonvoting,
cumulative preferred securities with an interest rate of eight
percent.104 Like other TARP CPP investments, the Treasury
Department would only be entitled to appoint two directors
(managers) of GMAC if the company missed six aggregate dividend payments.105
In May 2009 the Automotive Task Force restructured the
Treasury Department’s investment. The Treasury Department
purchased an additional $7.875 billion in preferred securities in

99. As GM recovers financially, it has asserted its independence from the
government, most notably by making the AmeriCredit acquisition against the
Treasury Department’s wishes. See Josh Kosman, GM Drive-By Deal—
AmeriCredit Acquisition Annoys Feds, N.Y. POST, Sept. 7, 2010, at 25, available at 2010 WLNR 17771655.
100. See Emily Kaiser, GMAC Gets Fed’s OK to Become a Holding Company,
REUTERS, Dec. 24, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/12/
24/us-financial-gmac-idUSTRE4BN4BL20081224.
101. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces
TARP Investment in GMAC (Dec. 29, 2008), available at http://www.treasury
.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1335.aspx (announcing the Treasury
Department’s TARP investment in GMAC).
102. See id.
103. GM 2009 Loan Agreement, supra note 98.
104. Securities Purchase Agreement annex A, Dec. 29, 2008, between
GMAC LLC & U.S. Department of the Treasury [hereinafter GMAC December
Investment Terms], available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial
-stability/investment-programs/aifp/Pages/initiatives/financial-stability/investment
-programs/aifp/Documents_Contracts_Agreements/GMAC%20Agreement%20
Dated%2029%20December%202008.pdf.
105. Id.
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GMAC.106 Part of this sum was provided to allow GMAC to assume the financing obligations of Chrysler Financial.107 After
this transaction, GMAC renamed itself Ally Financial.108 The
newly renamed company would provide financial services to
both GM and Chrysler.109 The Treasury Department also exercised rights it had under its loan to GM to convert this loan into
a fifty-six percent ownership interest in GMAC (from a previous thirty-five percent ownership stake).110
On December 30, 2009, the Treasury Department’s investment was restructured a third time. The Treasury Department purchased an additional $2.54 billion in trust preferred
securities yielding eight percent and $1.25 billion in mandatory
convertible preferred securities yielding nine percent which automatically converted to common stock after seven years.111 At
the same time, the Treasury Department also converted $3 billion of its mandatory convertible preferred securities into
GMAC common stock, which raised its ownership interest to
56.3 percent.112 The remaining 43.7 percent of GMAC was held
as follows: 16.6 percent of GMAC remained in the hands of GM,
which put 9.9 percent of this interest into a trust.113 GM also
agreed to sell these shares over a three-year period. Cerberus,
GMAC’s former controlling shareholder held the remaining
shares, but distributed out 12.2 percent of these shares directly
to investors in its relevant funds leaving Cerberus with a 14.9
percent interest.114
In connection with this third investment, the Treasury Department agreed that it would appoint four of the nine board
106. Glenn Somerville & Corbett Daly, U.S. Pours $7.5 Billion into Auto
Lender GMAC, REUTERS, May 21, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/
article/2009/05/22/us-financial-gmac-capital-idUSTRE54K6NF20090522?feed
Type=RSS&feedName=businessNews&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=
feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+reuters%2FbusinessNews+%28News+%2F+US+
%2F+Business+News%29.
107. Master Transaction Agreement, supra note 71.
108. See Aparajita Saha-Bubna & Nathan Becker, Ally to Phase Out GMAC
Brand Name, WALL ST. J., July 13, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704518904575365273082277584.html.
109. Id.
110. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, MARCH OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE UNIQUE
TREATMENT OF GMAC UNDER THE TARP 43 (2010) [hereinafter GMAC COP
REPORT].
111. GMAC December Investment Terms, supra note 104, sched. A.
112. See GMAC COP REPORT, supra note 110, at 43.
113. See id. at 43 n.248.
114. Id.
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members on the GMAC board.115 On December 29, 2009, the
Treasury Department converted $5.5 billion of the preferred securities to raise its stake in GMAC (now Ally Financial) to 73.8
percent.116 In connection with this increase in its ownership
provision, the Ally board of directors was increased to eleven
members and the Treasury Department became entitled under
the stockholders agreement to appoint six members of this
board.117
There was no independence requirement for these directors.118 The Cerberus affiliates and management also each designated one director.119 The remaining directors were required
to be independent and were designated by the other directors
with a requirement that at least one Treasury Department
nominee concur.120 The Treasury Department never established
a trust to hold and vote the government’s ownership interest,
despite the government’s earlier intimations. Indeed, the true
control rights the government asserted over GMAC are unknown and the Congressional Oversight Panel (COP) has been
particularly critical of the Treasury Department’s management
of this investment.121
Similar to the GM and Chrysler investments, the government also maintained a veto over certain material stockholder
decisions such as a sale or the issuance of more senior debt or

115. This right existed so long as the Treasury Department held between
fifty percent and 70.8 percent of GMAC. If the Treasury Department went
above this threshold, the board size would increase to eleven members and the
Department would become entitled to designate six members. See Amended
and Restated Governance Agreement exhibit 10.2, May 21, 2009, between
GMAC LLC, FIM Holdings LLC, GM Finance Co. Holdings LLC, and U.S. Department of the Treasury [hereinafter GMAC FIM Agreement], available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40729/000119312509117131/dex102.htm.
116. Maya Jackson Randall, Treasury Converts $5.5 Billion of Ally Preferred Stock, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704543004576052241726394886.html.
117. Ally Financial Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 30, 2010), available
at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40729/000119312510291571/d8k.htm.
118. See GMAC FIM Agreement, supra note 115, exhibit 10.2 (requiring
fewer independent managers as the Treasury Department’s ownership increased).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See GMAC COP REPORT, supra note 110, at 2 (criticizing the “missed
opportunities” to increase accountability and protect the taxpayer).
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equity securities.122 Unlike the GM investment in this case, the
government did not prenegotiate a postinvestment IPO date.123
E. BANK OF AMERICA
The Treasury Department’s initial investment in Bank of
America was a $25 billion purchase of preferred securities in
connection with its $125 billion investment in the nine largest
financial institutions.124 Bank of America would come more
firmly under the government’s foot when it controversially
agreed to complete its acquisition of Merrill Lynch with the understanding that it would obtain additional government assistance.125 On January 15, 2009, and after it had acquired Merrill
Lynch, Bank of America received another $20 billion investment from the Treasury Department under the TARP Targeted
Assistance Program.126 The Treasury Department also received
warrants to purchase 150.3 million shares of Bank of America
common stock in connection with both investments.127
The Treasury Department never obtained control rights or
equity ownership beyond its warrant interests in Bank of
America. Nonetheless, as with its other investments, the government still wielded great influence. In connection with the
acquisition of Merrill Lynch, Secretary of the Treasury Henry
Paulson threatened to remove the CEO of Bank of America,
Ken Lewis, and its board if they attempted to terminate the acquisition.128 This threat came despite Paulson’s lack of regulatory authority. Meanwhile, Bank of America’s board was subsequently restructured at the government’s behest and Mr.
122. GMAC FIM Agreement, supra note 115, at 10.
123. Id.
124. See Mark Landler, U.S. Investing $250 Billion to Bolster Banks; Dow
Surges 936 Points, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2008, at A1, available at 2008 WLNR
19535647.
125. David Mildenberg & Bradley Keoun, Bank of America to Acquire Merrill as Crisis Deepens (Update 4), BLOOMBERG, Sept. 15, 2008, http://www
.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a9O9JGOLdI_U.
126. David Goldman et al., BofA: $20B Bailout, Huge Merrill Loss,
CNNMONEY, Jan. 16, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/16/news/companies/
bofa_new_bailout/index.htm?postversion=2009011604.
127. Greg Robb, U.S. Makes 1.54 Bln from Bank of America Warrants,
MARKETWATCH, Mar. 4, 2010, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/us-makes
-154 -bln-from-bank-of-america-warrants-2010-03-04 -90360.
128. See Liz Rappaport, Lewis Testifies U.S. Urged Silence on Deal, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 23, 2009, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB
124045610029046349.html?KEYWORDS=Lewis+Testifies+US+Urged+Silence+
on+Deal (discussing allegations that Mr. Paulson made such a threat).
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Lewis resigned under government pressure.129 The bank also
came under special supervision pursuant to a secret memorandum of understanding among the bank, the Office of Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Reserve.130
F. TARP RECIPIENTS
The final significant government investment was through
the CPP. Seven hundred and seven financial institutions eventually participated.131 The Treasury Department purchased
nonconvertible preferred securities at a discounted market rate
that paid an initial dividend of five percent and a dividend of
nine percent after five years.132 The Treasury Department also
received warrants or their equivalent convertible into common
stock equal to fifteen percent of the value of the investment.133
The Treasury Department’s control rights were quite limited. The preferred securities were initially nonvoting, except
for limited voting rights in cases where more senior securities
were authorized, the rights of the preferred security holders
were amended, or the financial institution took any action to
adversely affect the preferred securities.134 If an issuer missed
six dividend payments then the government received the right
to appoint two directors.135 The Treasury Department also negotiated protective provisions preventing dividends or other
corporate maneuvers that would deprive the Treasury Department of its dividend payment. The preferred securities were redeemable by the company but did not contain a put feature allowing the Treasury Department to force the company to
129. Dan Fitzpatrick & Joann S. Lublin, Bank of America Chief Resigns
Under Fire, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2009, at A1, available at http://online
.wsj.com/article/SB125434715693053835.html?KEYWORDS=Bank+of+America+
Chief+Resigns+Under+FireKEYWORDS%3DBank+of+America+Chief+Resigns+
Under+Fire.
130. Dan Fitzpatrick, BofA Seeks Sanction’s End, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6,
2010, at C1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487046
57504575411602370266826.html?KEYWORDS=BofA+seeks+sanction%27s+end.
131. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TROUBLED ASSETS RELIEF PROGRAM
(TARP): MONTHLY 105(A) REPORT 9 fig.5 (2010) [hereinafter TARP STATUS
REPORT].
132. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, SUMMARY OF SENIOR PREFERRED
TERMS, TARP CAPITAL PURCHASE PROGRAM: SENIOR PREFERRED STOCK AND
WARRANTS, available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/
investment-programs/cpp/Documents/termsheet.pdf.
133. Id. at 4.
134. Id. at 3.
135. Id.
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repurchase the shares.136 The redemption provisions allowed
for half the warrants to be cancelled if they were redeemed by
December 31, 2009, and so created an incentive for banks to
raise private capital before that date if it was economical for
them to redeem the shares.137
II. ASSESSING GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP
Part I highlighted the diversity of government ownership
during the financial crisis. No single investment was identical
in structure or type. This Part sets forth the principles that the
Bush and Obama Administrations announced to guide government ownership and assesses the government’s adherence to
these principles. It then concludes by critiquing the government’s corporate governance arrangements. These investments
were an economic achievement, but it is questionable whether
the government’s corporate governance decisions were in the
public’s best interests.
A. THE GOVERNMENT’S PRINCIPLES
1. Ex Ante Structuring Principles
In the midst of the panic of 2008, the only relevant guidelines for government investment were the EESA’s mandate “to
restore liquidity and stability to the financial system of the
United States” and in doing so to “maximize . . . overall returns
to the taxpayers of the United States.”138 This mandate was
loose and subject to interpretation. Initially, the Bush Administration adopted no formal policies further outlining its approach. Officials, including Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson,
would later assert that the government attempted to erect
commercially negotiated ownership structures.139 As the finan136. Id. at 4 –5.
137. Id. at 5.
138. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343,
§ 2, 122 Stat. 3765, 3766. The COP would later broadly interpret this mandate
to include more general economic assistance, forming the basis of the bulk of
the COP’s criticism of TARP. See Steven M. Davidoff, As TARP Fades, a Look
at Its Flaws and Its Success, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Sept. 17, 2010, 3:26 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/09/17/as-tarp-expires-a-look-at-its-flaws-and
-success/ (discussing these criticisms).
139. See HENRY M. PAULSON, ON THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO STOP
THE COLLAPSE OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 307–08, 337–38 (2010) (explaining why the government preferred a hands-off ownership approach and
why it chose to invest in preferred stocks rather than simply buying “toxic assets” or common stock, which came with voting rights); RATTNER, supra note
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cial crisis progressed, the Obama Administration formalized
these principles in a memorandum written by Diana Ferrell,
Deputy Director of the National Economic Council. The memo
advocated the two-stage approach discussed in the introduction: investments should initially be structured on commercial
terms; thereafter, the government would take a hands-off
commercial approach.140
Then, on March 30, 2009, the Obama White House issued a
press release in connection with the GM bankruptcy, stating:
In exceptional cases where the U.S. government feels it is necessary to respond to a company’s request for substantial assistance, the
government will reserve the right to set upfront conditions to protect
taxpayers, promote financial stability and encourage growth. When
necessary, these conditions may include restructurings similar to that
now underway at GM as well as changes to ensure a strong board of
directors that selects management with a sound long-term vision to
restore their companies to profitability and to end the need for government support as quickly as is practically feasible.141

The GM press release was the first time the government
had publicly announced any policy with respect to the preinvestment structuring of its financial crisis investments. The release also marked a reversion from the commercial approach
officials initially described.142 Instead of commercial arrangements, the GM press release asserted that the government’s
goals were to “protect taxpayers, promote financial stability
and encourage growth.”143 None of these involved commercial
terms in the investment itself; instead, these were general
goals consistent with the government’s desire to act in ways
benefitting the entire economy rather than any individual company. The only wealth-maximizing statement with respect to
the actual investments was to the effect that the government’s
goal was to “restore their companies to profitability and to end
the need for government support as quickly as is practically
feasible.”144 In other words, the government was more interested in exiting these investments promptly than in earning a re63, at 132 (quoting President Obama as stating he wanted Chrysler assistance
to be “tough” and “commercial”).
140. ALTER, supra note 63, at 184.
141. Press Release, General Motors Restructuring, supra note 2; see also
OFS FINANCIAL REPORT 2009, supra note 57, at 42 (listing the government’s
four “principles to guide its actions as a common shareholder”).
142. Cf. PAULSON, supra note 139 (describing the initial desire for a commercial approach).
143. Press Release, General Motors Restructuring, supra note 2.
144. Id.
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turn. For example, the instrument for the AIG trust referred
only to the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department being repaid their investments; it did not mention a return.145
This press release was in reality a statement of the principles the Bush and Obama Administrations followed even
prior to that time when structuring their investments. The government did periodically operate as a commercial actor. The
AIG bailout was modeled on a privately negotiated financial
assistance package.146 The government’s private commercial
aspirations, though, were often superseded by public considerations. For example, the CPP program extended preferred financing to the financial sector on generous terms in order to
foster financial stability.147
The Treasury Department and other government agencies
did largely adhere to the Bush and Obama Administrations’
commitment to restructure management and boards of directors. The CEOs of AIG, Chrysler, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
General Motors, and GMAC were all replaced in connection
with the government’s investment.148 The boards of all of these
companies, as well as Bank of America’s and Citigroup’s, were
also significantly restructured.149 In particular, the government
encouraged the appointment of strong board chairmen as a

145. See AIG Trust Agreement, supra note 18 (outlining the nonbinding
views of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York that the voting power of the
“Trust Stock” should be exercised with an eye toward benefitting the public).
146. See Sjostrom, Jr., supra note 7, at 964 (describing the package in detail). Fannie and Freddie were also designed to mimic a commercial transaction although the government did not attempt to wipe out the GSE’s seniorpreferred stockholders or secured debt for political and economic reasons.
147. See René M. Stulz & Luigi Zingalees, The Financial Crisis: Comments
and Discussion an Inside View, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY,
1, 67 (2009); Lei Li, TARP Funds Distribution and Bank Loan Growth, 7 (June
21, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1515349 (“To encourage banks to participate in CPP,
the Treasury made the terms of CPP investments quite attractive.”).
148. See Dan Fitzpatrick & David Enrich, GMAC Chief Ousted by Board,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2009, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704538404574540032497128084.html (reporting the firing of
GMAC CEO Alvaro de Molina); supra notes 27–28, 92 and accompanying text.
149. See Eric Dash, As It Works to Find Its Stride and Renew Confidence,
Citigroup Shuffles Its Board, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2010, at B3, available at
2010 WLNR 4145189; Stephen Labaton & Andrew Ross Sorkin, U.S. Rescue
Seen at Hand for Two Mortgage Giants, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2008, at A1,
available at 2008 WL 16910682; supra notes 23–25, 76–81, 105, 118 and accompanying text.
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counterweight to the CEO influence.150 The government did at
times act politically and less than effectively in these restructurings—particularly with the automakers. But in large part
the government acted in accordance with its principles to replace and restructure the companies in which it made significant investments.
The government’s failure to negotiate full commercial
terms resulted in significantly diminished returns on its investments.151 In particular, the Treasury Department generally
eschewed taking equity in institutions.152 It only did so in extreme circumstances or if the post-investment capital structure
of the company could not tolerate other securities.153 The TARP
warrant requirements were only inserted at the insistence of
Congress.154 Some investments such as those in Bank of America and Chrysler Financial were deliberately structured so that
the government did not take an equity interest.155 Consequent150. See, e.g., Bill Vlasic, G.M. Chairman Vows to Defend Market Share,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2009, at B1, available at 2009 WLNR 15091209 (detailing
the objectives of GM’s board, over half of which was chosen by the government,
and which aimed to get the company’s management to repay the U.S. taxpayers for their financial assistance); Alistair Barr, AIG CEO Wins Power Struggle
as Chairman Resigns, MARKETWATCH, July 15, 2010, http://www.marketwatch
.com/story/aig-gets-new-chairman-golub-resigns-after-spat-2010-07-15 (detailing the conflicts between AIG’s chairman and CEO).
151. Jeffrey McCracken et al., Chrysler Financial’s Value Jumped 33% After U.S. Exit, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 22, 2010, available at http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/2010-12-22/chrysler-financial-value-jumped-33-after-u-s-exit-cerberus
-s-sale-shows.html.
152. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Department Releases Text of Letter from Secretary Geithner to Hill Leadership on
Administration’s Exit Strategy for TARP (Dec. 9, 2009) [hereinafter Dep’t of
the Treasury Press Release], available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/
press-releases/Pages/tg433.aspx.
153. In cases such as Bank of America and Chrysler Financial the government deliberately decided to avoid an equity stake. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (Chrysler), and supra note 128 and accompanying text (Bank
of America).
154. 154 CONG. REC. H10712-02 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 2008) (statement of Rep.
Barney Frank). Congress also directed the Treasury Department not to vote
with any stock it may acquire, pursuant to these warrants. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 113(d)(1)(A), 122 Stat.
3765, 3778.
155. In the case of Chrysler Financial, the Treasury Department extended
a TARP Automotive Industry Financing Program loan on January 16, 2009,
for $1.5 billion. The mandatory warrants issued in connection with this transaction, however, were for additional notes to be issued by the special purpose
vehicle. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces
TARP in Chrysler Financial (Jan. 16, 2009), available at http://www.treasury
.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1362.aspx.
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ly, when the market rebounded, the government did not reap as
significant gains as it otherwise could have.156
The Treasury Department’s “regulation by deal” approach
also encouraged drift from purer commercial principles.157 Each
investment was negotiated as a unique enterprise due to differing legal, political, and commercial factors.158 This approach
was partly unavoidable due to the circumstances of the rescue
and the government’s limited statutory authority. But it encouraged an excessive amount of dealmaking—dealmaking that
provided the government latitude to bestow private benefits to
stakeholders and outside parties.159
Despite the heterogeneous nature of its investments and
the implementation problems described above, the government
largely met its self-announced goal to “encourage financial stability.”160 These investments were part of a broader program
that succeeded in halting the financial panic.161 The government’s success in meeting these principles was largely due to
their definitional breadth. These successes say nothing of the
legitimacy of the underlying principles.
2. Ex Post Facto Structuring Principles
The government adopted principles to govern its conduct
after its investments as well.162 In these circumstances, the
government took great pains to forfeit control over these corporate enterprises. In its monthly TARP reports the Treasury
Department regularly reiterated that it would vote its shares
only with respect to the election or removal of directors and
other significant matters, but would otherwise abstain from
voting.163
This policy was largely in line with the post-investment
principles that the Treasury Department annunciated when it
156.
157.
158.
159.

McCracken et al., supra note 151.
See infra notes 205–31.
See, e.g., RATTNER, supra note 63, at 120–23.
See Steven M. Davidoff, Valuing Ally Financial, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Jan. 3, 2011, 9:05 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/03/
valuing-ally-financial/ (discussing how different government actions might have
resulted in large benefits for taxpayers rather than private investors).
160. See infra notes 191–92 and accompanying text.
161. See infra notes 191–92 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Press Release, General Motors Restructuring, supra note 2
(articulating standards for the Treasury Department’s conduct post-acquisition).
163. TARP STATUS REPORT, supra note 131, at 23; see also Dep’t of the
Treasury Press Release, supra note 152.
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announced the GM bankruptcy. At that time, the Treasury Department stated:
After any up-front conditions are in place, the government will
protect the taxpayers’ investment by managing its ownership stake in
a hands-off, commercial manner. The government will not interfere
with or exert control over day-to-day company operations. No government employees will serve on the boards or be employed by these
companies.164

In practice, the government, including the Treasury Department, surpassed these principles. In its AIG, Bank of
America, Chrysler, Citigroup, GM, and GMAC investments, the
government deliberately ceded even more control than this policy envisioned.165
In some measure, the varying approaches were due to the
government’s shifting policies as the financial crisis progressed
and presidential Administrations changed. The Bush Administration settled upon and implemented the complete forfeiture of
control in the case of AIG.166 It was also the only ownership interest held by the Federal Reserve. But this policy changed at
some point. The Obama Administration’s Treasury Department
refrained from the use of trust mechanisms and otherwise retained the right to appoint directors in instances where it obtained majority control.167 Even then, however, the Obama
Administration adopted mechanisms to deprive it of majority
control in the case of GMAC.168 The government’s aversion to
control thus continued throughout the financial crisis.
Why did the Treasury Department take such extreme
steps? Why did it even feel the need to divest itself of control at
all? The government never directly answered these questions,
and the subject is a topic for an entire book.169 The summary
answer likely involves a mixture of ideological, political, and
practical rationales. First, we live in a society that almost uniformly understands itself as capitalist.170 Whether or not one
164. Press Release, General Motors Restructuring, supra note 2.
165. See generally Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 1 (discussing government
attempts to handle the effects of the financial crisis).
166. The trust instrument specifically stated that it was established “to
avoid any possible conflict with [the New York Fed’s] supervisory and monetary policy functions.” AIG Trust Agreement, supra note 18.
167. See Black, supra note 5, at 592 (explaining that the Treasury Department only acquired the right to appoint four of nine directors).
168. See Verret, supra note 4, at 295–96.
169. See generally RATTNER, supra note 63, passim.
170. “Capitalism” Not So Sacred to Americans as Mood Sours, BUS. WK.,
July 13, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-07-13/-capitalism-not
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believes that state ownership of enterprise can legitimately exist in a capitalist environment, the American public defines
capitalism in a manner that excluded this possibility.171 Under
most political theories, the Bush and Obama Administrations
were incentivized to cater to a viewpoint held by almost all interest groups.172 Conservative commentators repeatedly tagged
the Obama Administration in particular with the mantra of socialism.173 By committing to quickly dispose of these entities
and exercise little control, the Obama Administration could attempt to dispel this stigma.
Second, the government’s position also had a real wealthmaximizing benefit. The government’s position limited undue,
wealth-destroying political influence beyond the Treasury Department and presidential administration.174 It also jibed with
the apparent economic beliefs of Henry Paulson, Timothy
Geithner, and Larry Summers that these businesses should not
be politicized.175 Indeed, Geithner and Summers adopted this
ethos during the currency and country financial crises of the
1990s.176 The specter of politicization in the financial crisis was
a real threat as politicians repeatedly attempted to influence or
act legislatively to operate these entities.177 Market actors also
appeared to view the government’s forfeiture of control as re-so-sacred-to-americans-as-mood-sours.html (noting that seventy percent of
Americans support free enterprise and free markets).
171. See Anthony Faiola, The End of American Capitalism?, WASH. POST,
Oct. 10, 2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2008/10/09/AR2008100903425.html (noting the intensely hands-off approach of government in American capitalism).
172. Gregory P. Magarian, Market Triumphalism, Electoral Pathologies,
and the Abiding Wisdom of First Amendment Access Rights, 35 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1373, 1414 (2007) (noting that due to our political process, interest
groups can “capture” elected officials).
173. See, e.g., Glenn Beck: Barack Obama, Socialist? (Fox News television
broadcast Apr. 6, 2010) (“But if you’re into redistribution of wealth, I’m sorry,
but that is a Marxist principle . . . . Marx said that. Madison never said that.
Our Founders all warned against that. They didn’t think it was better to
‘spread the wealth around.’”), transcript available at http://www.foxnews.com/
story/0,2933,590532,00.html.
174. See Press Release, General Motors Restructuring, supra note 2.
175. Cf. ROBERT RUBIN & JACOB WEISBERG, IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD:
TOUGH CHOICES FROM WALL STREET TO WASHINGTON 14 –16 (2003) (expressing
surprise about political opposition to assisting Mexico during its financial crisis).
176. Id.
177. Verret, supra note 4, at 296 (“[T]he President’s Auto Task Force determined that Chrysler’s restructuring plan was not likely to permit it to
emerge from bankruptcy, and pressured Chrysler to arrange a merger deal
with Fiat.”).
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storing faith in the troubled companies and in capitalism generally.178
In contrast to the mixed adherence to its control principles,
the government rigorously followed its stated goal to quickly
(as soon as practicable) disentangle itself from the private sector. At the time of this writing, the government has already
disposed of its Citigroup shares and orchestrated an initial public offering for GM.179 In addition, the Federal Reserve and
Treasury Department effectively encouraged financial institutions to repay TARP money as soon as possible.180 The Treasury Department struggled mightily to end its other programs
with similar haste.181 Though the calculation is uncertain, it
appears that this effort diminished the returns the government
otherwise could have received from its investments.182 This
headlong rush to dispose of these interests was again a product
of the same factors that led the government to deliberately forego control over its investments.183
B. ASSESSING THE GOVERNMENT’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
ARRANGEMENTS
The Treasury Department and other government agencies
adopted a bifurcated approach to corporate governance. At the
time of its investment, the government repeatedly acted to remove and replace executives and restructure boards of directors.184 Afterwards, the government took great pains to divest
itself of day-to-day control, or even any direct control.185
The government’s approach appeared to be successful. It
largely exited from these investments with an economic return,
178. Clare Baldwin & Soyoung Kim, GM Shares Lose Momentum in PostIPO NYSE Return, REUTERS, Nov. 18, 2010, available at http://www.reuters
.com/article/2010/11/18/us-gm-ipo-idUSTRE6AB43H20101118?pageNumber=2
(noting that the GM IPO points toward renewed confidence in the industry).
179. Michael de la Merced & Bill Vlasic, U.S. Recovers Billions in Sale of
G.M. Stock, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2010, at A1, available at 2010 WLNR
22969625.
180. Edmund L. Andrews, Calling on Big Banks to Repay Bailout Now,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2009, at B1, available at 2009 WLNR 20328304.
181. See Michael J. de la Merced, Picking Up Pieces of the Bailout Stock Sale
Action, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 4, 2011, 4:42 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes
.com/2011/02/04/picking-up-pieces-of-the-bailout-stock-sale-action/?src=dlbksb.
182. See McCracken et al., supra note 151.
183. See supra notes 165–79 and accompanying text.
184. See Sterngold & Christie, supra note 24.
185. See generally Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 1 (discussing government
attempts to handle the effects of the financial crisis).
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and the companies themselves returned to profit. For example,
the government has made $22 billion on the $85 billion it invested in AIG during the financial crisis.186 The net loss from
the entire TARP program is currently estimated by the COP to
be $66 billion.187 Compare these figures to some early predictions that the United States would lose the $700 billion initial
EESA investment commitment and be required to expend additional sums to alleviate the financial and banking crisis.188 In
addition, the Treasury Department obtained more money than
it invested with respect to Bank of America, Citigroup, and the
707 CPP recipients on the whole.189 With respect to AIG, GM,
and GMAC, the government is likely to recover near its total
investment. Chrysler is an unknown at this time but is likely to
result in a significant loss. The real aggregate loss from these
investments is probably, at worst, less than one percent of the
gross domestic product of the nation.190 This is a small sum to
pay to halt a running financial panic and credit crisis.
The Treasury Department’s ex ante restructurings were effective,191 but it remains unknown how these post-transaction
structures worked in actuality. The governance mechanics of
these entities and the government’s interaction with the company’s management and boards remain largely undisclosed. We
must await the historians and journalists to write a record of
what occurred behind the scenes to definitively assess how the
Treasury Department’s corporate governance decisions functioned. In particular, without knowledge of the internal workings of these companies during that time, we do not know the
impact of the administrations’ soft control of these investments.
186. Editorial, Our View on TARP: Hated Bank Bailout Is About to Turn a
Profit, USA TODAY, Feb. 8, 2011, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/
opinion/editorials/2011-02-09-editorial09_ST_N.htm.
187. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, SEPTEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT:
ASSESSING THE TARP ON THE EVE OF ITS EXPIRATION 108 (2010) (citation
omitted); Douglas Elmendorf, CBO’s Latest Projections for the TARP, CONG.
BUDGET OFF. DIRECTOR’S BLOG (Aug. 20, 2010, 10:06 AM), http://cboblog.cbo
.gov/?p=1322.
188. Paul Craig Roberts, A Futile Bailout as Darkness Falls on America,
DAILY TIMES, Oct. 8, 2008, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=
2008\10\08\story_8-10-2008_pg5_47 (“As the economy declines and mortgage
default rates rise, the US Treasury and the American taxpayers could end up
with a $700 billion loss.”).
189. See Editorial, supra note 186.
190. See Sewell Chan, In Study, 2 Economists Say Intervention Helped
Avert a 2nd Depression, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2010, at B8, available at 2010
WLNR 14973281.
191. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 187, at 22.
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The Treasury Department may have been so willing to give up
direct control because it still exercised significant force behind
the scenes.192 We do not yet know how the deliberations played
out within each administration.
Assessments are also difficult because the Treasury Department’s negotiated governance mechanisms were divergent
in practice.193 While it is clear that issues arose with unique
companies and particularly AIG, it is still unknown if any particular control mechanism worked better than others. In other
words, and with respect to the government’s significant investments: did the trust mechanism provide greater “space” to
AIG to restructure and perform on a more economical basis
than independent directors? When independent directors were
appointed, did this mechanic work better when the government
appointed a majority of these directors or when more commercial investors were present, as in the case of Fiat and the
Chrysler board? Even once more information about these governance mechanisms becomes available, our comparative assessment will be hampered because these divergent arrangements were never truly tested.
There are some indicia that the government was able to
assert effective restructurings through soft control and through
its independent director and trustee governance mechanisms.194 The government’s lack of formal control also served to
be a useful political device to provide cover for the government’s actions or inaction with respect to these companies.195

192. The government’s power in the case of financial institutions was also
buttressed by the regulatory control the government asserted through the
stress tests and other regulatory supervisory powers. Edmund L. Andrews &
Eric Dash, Treasury Sets Out Bank Test Guidelines, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2009,
at B1, available at 2009 WLNR 3695725.
193. See generally Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 1 (outlining the different
government responses employed during the financial crisis).
194. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
195. The best example of this occurred when the country erupted in fury
over the payment of $165 million to employees at AIG Financial Products, the
AIG subsidiary that originated the derivative products that felled the company. President Obama ordered Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner “to use
that leverage and pursue every single legal avenue to block these bonuses and
make the American taxpayers whole.” Obama Tells Geithner to Block A.I.G.
Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Mar. 16, 2009, 12:50 PM), http://dealbook
.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/16/obama-tells-geithner-to-block-aig-bonuses/. However, Larry Summers, head of the National Economic Council, would later claim
that this could not be accomplished due to legal limitations and the lack of government control over AIG. Henry Blodget, Larry Summers’ Ludicrous View on
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This lack of control, but continued ownership, nonetheless
imposed its own costs. For example, AIG executives at times
adopted an us-versus-them approach. The general counsel of
AIG attempted to organize a mass executive resignation to protest the TARP compensation requirements.196 Employees at
other firms such as Citigroup also often took public stands
against the government.197 It also appears that the government’s lack of direct control and power over executive compensation allowed these entities to pay undue amounts to their
employees at the government’s expense.198 Failure to exercise
control meant that in many cases government policies, such as
home ownership and small business loan programs, were not
implemented to the full extent the government may have
wished.199 In other cases, it meant that these corporate enterprises failed to take business decisions the government otherwise viewed as commercially preferable.200
The success or failure of the government’s approach was
never truly publicly tested. Instead, the economic upturn
caused by other government programs and the Treasury Department’s quick exit from the majority of these enterprises
meant that the government never was directly opposed by the
boards of these companies. The government’s corporate governance mechanisms were largely untested. Nonetheless, the quick
exit of many companies from government ownership provides
some evidence and a caveated conclusion that the government’s
approach to control functioned to its stated effect.201
The evidence is more robust with respect to the government’s more commercial pre-ownership restructurings than its
AIG Bonuses, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 17, 2009, 1:34 PM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/henry-blodget/larry-summers-ludicrous-v_b_175867.html.
196. See Debra Cassens Weiss, AIG GC Reportedly Threatens to Resign if
Pay Czar Cuts Her Compensation, A.B.A. J., Dec. 8, 2009, http://www
.abajournal.com/news/article/aig_gc_reportedly_threatens_to_resign_if_pay_
czar_cuts_her_compensation/.
197. For an example of tension between Citigroup and the U.S. government, see Krishna Guha & Francesco Guerrero, Treasury Pushes Citi to Cancel Jet Order, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e4093646
-eca6-11dd-a534 -0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1DTzm6WKk.
198. Steven Rattner, for example, writes of the post-restructuring GM and
its initial failures to continue the reorganizing measures he advocated.
RATTNER, supra note 63, at 253.
199. See, e.g., id. at 273–87 (discussing GM’s failure to sell GM’s German
division, Opel).
200. Id.
201. See Editorial, supra note 186.
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continued ex ante operation and ownership of these companies.
The government may have signaled its own dissatisfaction with
its corporate governance arrangements in its 2010 restructurings of AIG and GMAC. In the case of AIG, the Treasury Department abandoned trust and independent director mechanisms in favor of direct control.202 Similarly, at the end of 2010
the Treasury Department raised its stake in GMAC and obtained the right to appoint a majority of GMAC’s directors
without an independence requirement.203
III. LESSONS FOR FUTURE GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP
The government’s ownership experience resulted in a relatively small economic loss.204 But as noted in Part II, this success—due in significant part to other government actions—may
have otherwise obscured defects in the government’s approach.
This Part attempts to draw some lessons from the ownership
experience. Part III first discusses the theoretical implications
of the government’s ownership experience and then turns to
more practical lessons.
A. GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
THEORY
The economic and political literature on state-owned enterprises is thick, but it is almost exclusively devoted to longterm, intentional ownership of private entities.205 In the financial crisis, ownership—forced unwillingly on the government—
was episodic. Theoretical observations are thus more aptly confined to dealmaking and corporate design. In the dealmaking
realm, the government structured one-off solutions to each enterprise, negotiating agreements within the law and the prior
contractual arrangements that bound the parties.206

202. Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 1, at 497–98.
203. See David Welch, GMAC Chairman Merkin: On the Way Out, BUS.
WK., Dec. 31, 2008, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/
dec2008/db20081231_175310.htm.
204. See McCracken et al., supra note 151.
205. For a discussion of this theory, see generally D. Daniel Sokol, Competition Policy and Comparative Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1713.
206. See generally Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 1 (discussing the government’s response to the financial crisis as taking on a “dealmaker” role, and detailing the approach taken by the government in some specific incidents).
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Corporate design in the financial crisis was a different
beast than ordinary, private models of investment.207 Theorizing about this ownership within existing corporate archetypes
is difficult.208 The government’s ownership during the financial
crisis simply did not fit exclusively within any existing corporate ownership typology.209 Nor did the government’s ownership model fit within a corporatism or director primacy framework.210
The government asserted that it acted akin to a private
equity firm in adopting hands-off governance models postinvestment.211 But private equity firms are defined by the control they assert post-acquisition through which they eliminate
many of the agency costs associated with public, dispersed
ownership.212 The government may have acted like a private
equity firm prior to obtaining control, but its forfeiture of postownership control instead appears to be more akin to an institutional investor. Like an institutional investor, the government relied on extrinsic market forces and norms to ensure
that it could continue to exert control over these entities after
acquisition of ownership.213
The analogy with an institutional investor also breaks
down though, because the government did not have the same
exit potential as these investors. If the institutional investor
disagrees with management, it typically has the option of selling its investment in the public market.214 The government did
not have this alternative, at least at the time it made these investments. In some cases, the entities in which the government
invested were private, which eliminated a public-sale option altogether.215 But even for investments in public companies, the
government was effectively barred from selling its stakes during the financing crisis. The sale of a significant stake (or even
a small stake) in a public entity like Citigroup would likely

207. Verret, supra note 4, at 285.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. ALTER, supra note 63, at 184.
212. Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 1, at 539.
213. See id. at 538–40.
214. Black, supra note 5, at 585 (noting government sales of private stocks).
215. Id. at 573; see also Aaron Elstein, Largest U.S. Privately Held Bank
Still Hasn’t Paid Back TARP Loan, INVESTMENT NEWS, Feb. 28, 2010, at 18,
available at 2010 WLNR 4498809.
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have spurred further market distress, thus undermining the
very purpose of the government’s investments.216
In the private context, comparisons with institutional investor governance are less appropriate due to the government’s
reliance on independent directors.217 In the public sphere, independent directors are increasingly the norm as well as a regulatory requirement under stock exchange rules.218 However, the
same market pressures which act as a force on independent directors in public companies are absent in the private sphere.219
There are no stockholder activists, analysts, stock price movements, or ratings agencies for a private company.
The government at times also acted like a venture capitalist.220 A venture capitalist often foregoes direct governance
rights but exercises power through the ability to withhold later,
necessary capital.221 Though the government’s investments
were initially structured along these lines, the government
subsequently attempted to invest on the assumption that no
further capital would be needed.222 Part of the reason why the
government was forced to continuously restructure many investments was that each one was structured as a complete and
final investment. When circumstances changed, the government lacked the flexibility to adjust its investments without entirely restructuring them.223
Government corporate ownership during the crisis ultimately did not fit neatly into any single-investor model.224 Government ownership also did not fit within any unifying theory

216. See Nicole Bullock et al., Trading Goes Wild on Wall Street, FIN. TIMES,
May 7, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0cbdcdc2-5966-11df-99ba-00144feab49a
.html#axzz1DTzm6WKk (citing a rumor “that a Citigroup trader had typed
‘billions’ instead of ‘millions’ . . . prompting . . . panic selling”).
217. Solomon & Enrich, supra note 49 (noting that the Treasury Department called for the appointment of independent directors to Citigroup’s governing board).
218. Black, supra note 5, at 566–67.
219. See id. at 567 (discussing the effects of shareholders and other stakeholders on independent directors).
220. Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 1, at 538–41.
221. Id.
222. Cf. id. at 540–41 (noting that the a model the government adopted in
the bailouts intentionally hindered further investment by the Treasury Department, presumably for political reasons).
223. See id.
224. See generally id. (discussing the various forms of government corporate ownership coming out of the financial crisis).
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of corporate governance.225 In the initial stages of the financial
crisis, some theorists postulated that the government had taken a corporatist turn.226 The state had entered a new era of
progressivism, using its power and influence to direct and
shape corporations. However, the government deliberately deprived itself of its corporatist overtones through its formal ownership arrangements.227 It may have exercised a measure of
control through soft and regulatory-supervisory powers, but in
its contractual arrangements the government divested itself of
control.228 Even this exercise of indirect control was a direct
product of the financial crisis and accompanying panic. As the
crisis and panic dissipated, companies’ reliance on the government for survival faded, and the Treasury Department’s ability
to interfere with companies diminished.229 Corporatism may
have thrived in other areas of the U.S. economy during this
time, but in the arena of government ownership it was a fleeting affair.230
Nor does the government’s conduct provide significant
support for the director primacy model.231 The Treasury Department utilized independent directors to govern its corporate
investments.232 In its main formulation, the efficacy of this
theory relies on the forces of public markets to hold directors
accountable. These forces did not exist for the government’s
main investments.233 The Treasury Department’s control struc225. Id. at 540 (“[T]he government’s deals looked quite different from traditional privately negotiated deals.”).
226. See William W. Bratton & Michael Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s
Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L.
99, 103 (2008) (“Corporatism implies a radical restatement of the purpose of
the business corporation . . . . But it does this only at the threshold, the point
at which corporations come to the state-directed table where the groups determine the public interest.”).
227. See Press Release, General Motors Restructuring, supra note 2.
228. See supra notes 182–83 and accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., Josh Kosman, GM’s AmeriCredit Acquisition Irks Feds, N.Y.
POST, Sep. 7, 2010, at 25, available at 2010 WLNR 17771655.
230. See generally DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL (2011) (discussing the corporatist nature of the Dodd-Frank reforms).
231. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2003) (“[D]irector primacy
claims that shareholders are the appropriate beneficiaries of director fiduciary
duties. Hence, director accountability for maximizing shareholder wealth remains an important component of director primacy.”).
232. Black, supra note 5, at 569.
233. Chrysler, GM, and GMAC all became privately held companies. See
Verret, supra note 4, at 295.
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tures or lack thereof were also never tested. Its performance is
thus at best an endorsement—rather than a validation—of independent directors.
Despite the lack of validation for corporatist and director
primacy governance theories, the government’s ownership provides measured support for a social norms theory of corporate
governance. Jonathan Macey argues that what we often call fiduciary duties do not have the force of law.234 Rather, they are
simply promises which are kept and enforced through social
norms.235 The government may have forfeited formal control
because it could still exert sufficient control through the board’s
adherence to norms.236 These norms themselves may have been
strengthened due to the presence of the government and notions of civic duty associated with it.237 It appears that the government was relying more on a “norms” theory of board governance than a director primacy one.
In the wake of the financial crisis, the effectiveness of these
norms remains unclear. Reports arose of dissension among the
AIG board and its executives against government control.238
Citigroup and other entities rushed to remove themselves from
TARP executive compensation restrictions.239 GM referred to
its need to escape government ownership and its nickname of
“Government Motors” for commercial purposes.240 The Administration expressed frustration with the management of Bank
of America and Citigroup about their lending practices.241
Without more information about the internal workings of the
company’s governance, however, the best we can conclude at
234. See JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT,
PROMISES BROKEN 22–23 (2010).
235. Id.
236. For an alternative source of soft power, consider supra note 192 and
accompanying text.
237. See MACEY, supra note 234, at 23, 26–27.
238. See, e.g., Op-ed., Dear A.I.G., I Quit!, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2009, at
A29, available at 2009 WLNR 5575910 (transcribing a letter from Jake DeSantis, the AIG Vice-President, to Edward M. Liddy, the CEO of AIG).
239. Eric Dash & Andrew Martin, Wells Fargo to Repay U.S., a Coda to the
Bailout Era, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2009, at B1, available at 2009 WLNR
25221011.
240. See Charles Lane, GM Moves Away from “Government Motors,” WASH.
POST VOICES (Jan. 28, 2011, 6:22 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/
postpartisan/2011/01/gm_moves_away_from_government.html.
241. See Crisis Panel Blames Wall Street, Washington, BUS. WK., Jan. 26,
2011, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-01-26/crisis-panel-report-blames
-wall-street-washington.html (noting that Democrats blamed the “dramatic
failures of corporate governance and risk management”).
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this point was that the efficacy of reliance on norms for corporate governance in these circumstances is uncertain, and again
the government’s conduct was an endorsement of this theory
more than a validation of it.
Ultimately, the government’s ownership was a cobbling together of different models of governance, structures which varied depending upon the particular investment. In some cases,
the government acted in line with the venture capital model by
ensuring governance compliance through rounds of capital.242
At other times the government veered toward the private equity model through its ex ante corporate restructurings.243 Still
other times the government adopted a hands-off approach as an
institutional investor would.244 The government also relied on
the soft power it could assert through lending, as well as its
regulatory authority, to maintain the potential for control over
its investments.
B. LESSONS OF GOVERNMENT CORPORATE OWNERSHIP IN THE
MIDST OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
The lessons of government ownership in the recent crisis
are best characterized as general principles, not detailed guidelines or rules. The nature of the next financial crisis is inherently uncertain.245 This reality means that the government is
likely to require flexibility in structuring any investment. The
particular features of individual corporations as well as legal
limitations in effect at the time will also force the government
to diverge in the structure of its investment. Broad principles
are thus more appropriate rather than rigid rules.246
Government ownership of private enterprise is historically
rare.247 Before the current bout of ownership, there were few
prior examples in the post-World War II era. The government
investment in Chrysler was the most prominent.248 Also nota242. Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 1, at 538–41.
243. PAULSON, supra note 139, at 307–08, 337–38.
244. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 1, at 539–40.
245. Sebastian Mallaby, Financial Reform’s Uncertain Promise, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN REL. (May 21, 2010), http://www.cfr.org/united-states/financial
-reforms-uncertain-promise/p22183.
246. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 1, at 463–70.
247. Verret, supra note 4, at 293 (“We find no example from among this
rich history in which the government owned a controlling stake in a publicly
traded business incorporated under state law.”).
248. See Paul E. Tsongas, Did the Chrysler Bailout Work?, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 2, 1983, at A19, available at 1983 WLNR 504926.
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ble were the assistance the FDIC provided to Continental Illinois and the liquidation and work-out authority the Resolution
Trust Corporation established.249 The government apparently
did not rely on those experiences to structure its current ownership bout—notwithstanding some similarities.250
Government ownership is likely to continue to remain rare
for both legal and political reasons. Legally, the government is
restricted in its ability to own private companies.251 The Government Corporation Control Act of 1945 requires congressional authorization for the government to own private companies.252 The Act is one reason why the government initially
utilized a trust mechanism to hold the AIG interest.253 The new
financial reform bill also limits the ability of the Federal Reserve to use its section 13(3) power in the manner it did during
the financial crisis to provide financial assistance to companies.254 It is thus difficult for the government to find a statutory
hook on which to hang authority to own private enterprise.
This does not mean that government ownership of private
enterprise will not reoccur. It will instead take a crisis and the
forces it creates to push the government to stretch the law or
congressional authorization to justify future ownership.255 But
either case is apt to occur only in exigent circumstances.256
Ownership is therefore not only likely to be extraordinary due
249. See Black, supra note 5, at 576–78 (setting forth the history of government assistance provided to Continental Illinois in the 1980s).
250. See id. at 576–92 (comparing the government’s involvement in Continental Illinois with the government’s involvement in AIG and other financial
institutions).
251. 31 U.S.C. § 9102 (2006) (“An agency may establish or acquire a corporation to act as an agency only by or under a law of the United States specifically authorizing the action.”).
252. Id.
253. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 1, at 496–97. The government appeared to back away from this position when it took a 92.1 percent position in
the restructuring. Lynn Cowan et al., U.S. Treasury to Audition Bankers for
AIG Offering, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2011, at B3, available at 2011 WLNR
518471.
254. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343,
§ 129(d), 122 Stat. 3765, 3797 (“The provisions of this section shall be in force
for all uses of the authority provided under section 13 of the Federal Reserve
Act . . . .”). Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act gives the Federal Reserve the
power to discount securities in “unusual and exigent circumstances.” 12 U.S.C.
§ 343 (2006).
255. An example is how government involvement in the financial markets
expanded during the financial crisis. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 1, at
466–67.
256. See id.
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to the political atmosphere, but also because the law makes
such ownership difficult.257 There is thus no need at this point
to wade into the debate about whether government ownership
is ever appropriate, and if so, under what circumstances it is
justified. The question of when the government should take
ownership (rather than how it should govern once it obtains
ownership) is left for another article.
With these caveats in mind, several lessons from government ownership can be distilled. The Obama Administration’s
principles were largely implemented as announced, and effective as implemented.258 The government’s resort to commercial
principles to guide its ex ante investment structures was appropriate and economically beneficial to the government and
the nation.259 The Treasury Department did not always remain
true to these commercial principles—particularly in its postinvestment governance structures.260 More often than not,
though, these principles guided the Treasury Department’s actions.261 In future government investment, resort to commercial
principles is, absent full nationalization, likely to provide the
greatest benefit to the government and the nation and to ensure the continued viability of these corporate enterprises.262
These principles should apply both pre and postinvestment.
A commercial touchstone is a normative device designed to
frame optimal outcomes. It is the better initial principle because it provides an objective measure for this investment, and
ensures that the investment is wealth maximizing to the nation
as a whole and possibly on an individual basis.263 By implementation of commercial principles the government ensures that
the investment is a net gain for both the country and for individual investors.264 A commercial approach also limits private
257. 31 U.S.C. § 9102 (2006).
258. See supra notes 156–59 and accompanying text.
259. See generally PAULSON, supra note 139.
260. See AIG Trust Agreement, supra note 18.
261. I leave for others the issues of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which
were effectively nationalized and operated not for commercial rehabilitation
but rather for a public purpose. See Dale Arthur Oesterle, The Collapse of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Victims or Villains?, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS.
L.J. 733, 753 (2010).
262. Consider for example the outcome of the government’s investment in
AIG. McCracken et al., supra note 151.
263. This view is reflected in Secretary Geithner’s statement of purpose in
connections to the TARP bailout. See Dep’t of the Treasury Press Release, supra note 152.
264. Id.
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benefits by ensuring a return similar to what a commercial investor would reap.265 Moreover, consistent with the beliefs of
key officials such as Timothy Geithner and Larry Summers, it
ensures that the businesses are not politicized.266 The Treasury
Department’s application of these principles in its preinvestment restructurings illustrates how commercial principles can
ensure valid government investments.
The main observable defects in the government’s approach
lay in three areas. The government (1) failed to negotiate terms
and structure its investments to ensure an appropriate commercial-like return,267 (2) unduly forfeited and limited its control rights post-investment,268 and (3) allowed excess private
benefits to accrue to outside parties.269
The Treasury Department’s failure to negotiate terms that
could yield returns commensurate with a commercial transaction can be explained in part by political and economic considerations.270 The Treasury Department, however, often either
eschewed taking equity or structured its investments to avoid
acquiring control.271 Even in less intrusive investment programs when control was not a factor, such as the CPP, the
Treasury Department provided generous terms for its financing.272 The Department’s failure to negotiate full commercial
terms resulted in reduced returns.273 This failure appears to be
attributable to the Bush and Obama Administrations’ desire to
avoid control due to the political optics of government ownership.274 The Treasury Department’s aversion to control and private ownership also led to accusations that it disposed of the
government’s investments too quickly—further reducing the
government’s return on its investments.275 This charge was
made in the case of Citigroup and the CPP program. In both
265. See Davidoff, supra note 159.
266. See RUBIN & WEISBERG, supra note 175, at 14 –16.
267. See supra notes 156–59 and accompanying text.
268. See, e.g., Dep’t of the Treasury Press Release, supra note 152.
269. See Davidoff, supra note 159 (discussing how different government
actions might have resulted in large benefits for taxpayers rather than private
investors).
270. See RATTNER, supra note 63, at 120–23.
271. See, e.g., Dep’t of the Treasury Press Release, supra note 152.
272. See supra Part I.D.
273. See McCracken et al., supra note 151.
274. Consider the Treasury Department’s initial choice to delegate interest
in AIG to a trust. Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 1, at 496–97.
275. See, e.g., McCracken et al., supra note 151.
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cases, the government would have earned greater returns had
it held onto its investments only six months to a year longer.276
If control was the government’s problem, the Treasury Department itself revealed an alternative approach to managing
this problem. Rather than forfeit equity, privately negotiated
stockholders agreements can function to delimit control.277 Alternatively, the Treasury Department could have acquired equity through warrants providing it with the same measure of
return but without the voting and ownership interests of equity. The problem of equity (and the control that goes with it) is
thus manageable through private ordering. The government
should address the problem of control in the future through
these mechanisms rather than through equity forfeitures. The
government should invest and acquire equity as a commercial
actor would do in any distressed investment.
The Treasury Department still appeared to unduly limit its
control. Soft power and other corporate governance mechanisms may provide potential for sufficient control, but this is
again an unknown. True control through the appointment of
board members is a more significant check on a corporation’s
actions. While soft control may often suffice, in situations
where the size of the government’s stake warrants control—
majority or near majority ownership—the government should
negotiate the ability to freely remove and replace its appointed
directors. This level of control would provide a back-up route to
exert control over the enterprise. In such situations, there
should also be a tendency to take majority control if the investment warrants it. In other scenarios where majority control
is not acquired, the government should exercise the control that
accompanies less significant investments. Loan agreements
should be negotiated with appropriate covenants and preferred
share arrangements, which have quasi-market terms as to governance.
There remains the question of the efficacy of the government’s alternative approach: independent directors. Independent directors may have been effective, though this is ultimately
unknowable. The use of independent directors also avoided issues raised by others as to a conflict of fiduciary duties between
the directors and the government and possible litigation.278 But
276. Id.
277. Other mechanisms are also available, such as amendments to organizational documents of the company.
278. Black, supra note 5, at 569 (discussing how independent directors al-
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this appears to be an issue of low risk given that state courts
are unlikely to interfere with any government arrangement.279
Ultimately, while the means to replace these directors was valuable, the same forces that exert power on these directors in
the public sphere may not have existed.280
The government’s failure to fully exercise control and acquire equity reallocated this wealth to private actors. If the
government had implemented its investments in a purely
commercial manner these benefits would have been reduced,
particularly in the case of the automakers and GMAC.281 The
corollary, of course, is that these benefits would have accrued to
the investor—the American public. While some private benefits
are inevitable in this type of government intervention, the consequence during the financial crisis was not only reduced government benefits but public backlash against the government’s
program. The willingness of the Bush and Obama Administrations to tolerate this wealth allocation in connection with the
government ownership spurred passionate popular discontent
with the economic rescue package and provided significant
ammunition to critics of both Administrations.282 If there is a
principle to be derived here, it is that not only should private
benefits be limited to ensure an economic return for the public,
but that perception also matters. The government should, in
the future, limit these benefits not only in adherence to commercial principles but also for political necessity.
CONCLUSION
A fish in the midst of the ocean is unable to discern that it
is in water or even wet.283 We are still at sea amidst the finanlowed the government to maintain a “hands off ” shareholder policy).
279. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 1, at 468 (“Nor can one find much of
a role for states in this epic corporate reorganization and insurance crisis, even
though state law is the basis of corporate and insurance regulation.”); see also
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How to Prevent Hard Cases from Making
Bad Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware and the Strategic Use of Comity, 58 EMORY
L.J. 713, 758 (2008) (finding that because of its efficiency, Delaware will decide cases first and most state courts will defer to Delaware on novel matters).
280. Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 1, at 540 (“[T]he government’s deals
looked quite different from traditional privately negotiated deals.”).
281. See Davidoff, supra note 159.
282. Id.
283. This analogy is an old one, but a speech by former Federal Reserve
Governor Kevin Warsh brought it to mind. See Kevin Warsh, Governor, Fed.
Reserve, Speech at the New York University School of Law Global Economic
Policy Forum: Financial Market Turmoil and the Federal Reserve: The Plot
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cial crisis, and like fish we lack the perspective to make definitive assessments of the government’s financial crisis ownership
until significant time has passed. The true lessons of government ownership are thus left to history. Still, this Article has
attempted to highlight possible defects in the government’s
ownership experience as well as to draw early lessons. The
Treasury Department and other government agencies may
have appropriately relied on soft and alternative governance
forces to forfeit some level of control over its corporate investments. These agencies likely went too far, however, in forfeiting
ultimate control over these enterprises. These defects must be
set against the backdrop that the government’s investments
were largely repaid on an aggregate basis. This is a significant
accomplishment. It is a success which should be acknowledged.

Thickens (April 14, 2008), available
newsevents/speech/warsh20080414a.htm.
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